Opening Argument: Frederick argues that moral
responsiblity requires that we are free.
Moral Responsibility requires freedom according
to Frederick (and commonsense). Blaming people
and especially punishing them is unfair if they
aren't freely controlling the acts for which they
are being punished.
Frederick calls this commonsense the avoidance requirement. We should not be punished for an action unless we could have avoided doing it.
In order for us to hold people morally responsible, they have to be free.
Frederick calls this commonsense the avoidance requirement. We should not be punished for an action unless we could have avoided doing it.
In order for us to hold people morally responsible, they have to be free.
* Counter: Blame isn't about moral responsibility
Daniel agrees with Frederick that moral
responsibility requires freedom. Since we lack
freedom, according to him, we can't be morally
responsible. Daniel does believe however that we
can continue to blame and praise.
He isn't worried about Frederick's "avoidance requirement" because that is just another expression of preference. Frederick doesn't like to be blamed when he feels he isn't responsible, but Daniel doesn't care much about that. He just wants to make sure that more of the things that he likes are done and fewer of the things he dislikes are done by Frederick and everyone else.
- Blame and praise, says Daniel, aren't about freedom or moral responsibility.
- They are about controlling behavior.
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- We punish people to discourage/prevent them from doing bad things in the future.
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- We praise people to get them to do things we value.
- So-called moral claims are just expressions of preferences. "Murder is wrong" is just a fancy way of saying "I don't like murder." Saying that is of exactly the same import as saying "I like cherry-vanilla ice cream."
He isn't worried about Frederick's "avoidance requirement" because that is just another expression of preference. Frederick doesn't like to be blamed when he feels he isn't responsible, but Daniel doesn't care much about that. He just wants to make sure that more of the things that he likes are done and fewer of the things he dislikes are done by Frederick and everyone else.
First Response: What distinguishes punishment
from treatment?
Frederick says that if we can punish people to
change their behavior -- not because their
actions are immoral -- then punishment is no
different from treatment.
* 2nd Counter: Nothing (well almost nothing)
Daniel says, nothing distinguishes punishment
from treatment. Both are just ways to control
people's future behavior. It just turns out that
punishing a person who is mentally ill does not
make them act differently and giving medication
to "bad" people doesn't make them act
differently.
A Final Defense of the relationship between Free
Will and Responsibility
(It's really a defense of free will, itself)
This doesn't come from Daniel, Frederick, or Carolyn. It's from me (Schroer). Here's the problem (for Daniel) with denying we're free:
This doesn't come from Daniel, Frederick, or Carolyn. It's from me (Schroer). Here's the problem (for Daniel) with denying we're free:
- Here I am typing a bulleted list of claims that defend our freedom.
- If I just stop in the mid
Defense part two.
- If I just stop in the middle, nothing happens.
- The world cannot continue to function.
- All those things that I am supposedly determined to do will not happen.
- Daniel cannot explain why I have to pretend to be free in order for his determinism (which supposedly excludes free will) to work.